Security advisory: Java4Shell and eMudhra certificates

Two unrelated security issues affect Openfire installations right now, and both need action from you as an administrator. The first is a flaw in Java itself, nicknamed Java4Shell. The second is the eMudhra certificate authority incident, which affects the trust stores that Openfire ships with.

Neither is a bug in Openfire’s own code, and updating Openfire alone does not fix either of them. Below is what we know, and what you can do today.

Java4Shell: update your Java runtime

CVE-2026-114938, nicknamed Java4Shell, is a memory corruption bug in the hardware-accelerated Base64 decoder of OpenJDK. A specially crafted Base64 string can be used to write past the end of a buffer, and possibly to run code remotely without authentication. Oracle and the OpenJDK project released fixes on 17 November 2026.

Openfire processes Base64-encoded client data during authentication, including SASL authentication. This creates a potential attack surface before authentication has completed. Although we have not confirmed an Openfire-specific exploit, administrators should treat vulnerable installations as potentially exposed.

You are affected if all of these are true:

  • You run Java 17, 21, 25 or 27 from before the November 2026 security update. The fixed Oracle versions are 17.0.21.1, 21.0.13.1, 25.0.5.1 and 27.0.1.1. Standard Java 8 and Java 11 builds are not affected by Java4Shell. However, Oracle Java 8 Enterprise Performance Pack 8u511-perf and earlier are affected and should be updated to 8u513-perf.

  • Your server runs on x86-64 hardware exposing the CPU flags avx512f, avx512bw, avx512vbmi and bmi2. AVX-512 VBMI is the key feature, but check for all four flags. You can inspect the flags visible to Linux with:

    grep -m1 '^flags' /proc/cpuinfo | tr ' ' '\n' \
      | grep -E '^(avx512f|avx512bw|avx512vbmi|bmi2)$'
    

    The command should print all four flags. ARM64 systems are not affected. Note that virtual machines may expose a different set of CPU flags from the physical host.

What to do:

  1. Check which Java runtime the running Openfire process uses. The admin console shows the Java version on the Server Information page. You can also inspect the running process or its JVM details using your operating system’s process tools. Running java -version in a shell is only reliable if that command resolves to the same Java installation that Openfire uses.
  2. Install your Java vendor’s November 2026 security update and restart Openfire. For Oracle’s builds, the fixed versions are 17.0.21.1, 21.0.13.1, 25.0.5.1 and 27.0.1.1. Other vendors (Temurin, Corretto, Zulu, Red Hat, your Linux distribution) publish their fixes on their own schedule, so check their advisories.
  3. If no fixed build is available for you yet, you can disable the vulnerable Base64 intrinsic by adding -XX:+UnlockDiagnosticVMOptions -XX:-UseBASE64Intrinsics to the JVM options used by Openfire, and then restarting it. This is a temporary workaround, not a substitute for installing a fixed Java runtime. It is based on published mitigation guidance; test it with your Java vendor and remove it once you have installed a patched runtime.

The Openfire installers do not include a Java runtime, so there is no Openfire release that fixes this for you. The fix has to come from your Java vendor.

There is also a separate Java security issue related to the eMudhra incident. Oracle has published security alerts for CVE-2026-91403 and CVE-2026-114820, covering compromised eMudhra intermediate certificates and affected trust anchors in Java’s certificate stores. These are distinct from Java4Shell. Apply the relevant security updates for your Java vendor as well. Updating Java does not necessarily update Openfire’s separately maintained trust stores, so you must still check those as described below.

eMudhra: compromised certificate authorities

On 17 October 2026, researchers reported that the private keys of eight eMudhra intermediate certificate authorities (CAs), whose certificates are issued under the emSign brand, could be recovered because of weaknesses in their key generation. Anyone who recovered one of these keys could potentially issue certificates that chained to a trusted root. eMudhra revoked all eight intermediate CA certificates on 18 October. Browser root programmes also took action against emSign ECC Root CA - G3, the root associated with the compromised intermediates. eMudhra has announced that it will discontinue selling publicly trusted TLS certificates; its other PKI and digital identity businesses remain operational.

For an XMPP server this matters mostly for server-to-server connections: Openfire uses its trust store to decide whether a remote server really is who it claims to be. A forged certificate that Openfire trusts lets an attacker impersonate another XMPP domain.

Openfire ships its own trust store, separate from the one in Java. When you upgrade Openfire, your existing trust store is kept, so that changes you made to it are not lost. That also means that a fix in a future Openfire release, or in Java, will not clean up the trust store of an existing installation. You need to check it yourself.

There is a second complication. The eight intermediates were also cross-signed by Sectigo, under its AAA Certificate Services root. That root is in the Openfire trust store too. Mozilla and Google stopped trusting it for TLS in April 2025, and Microsoft and Apple have since removed it as well, so you can remove it from Openfire’s trust store too. Current Sectigo certificates chain to newer Sectigo roots that are also in the trust store. Sectigo has also revoked the cross-signatures, but that only helps if Openfire checks revocation, which is not enabled by default. More on both below.

How to check your trust stores

The following four eMudhra root certificates, and Sectigo’s AAA Certificate Services root, are relevant to this incident. Check whether they are present in your Openfire trust stores by comparing their SHA-256 fingerprints; do not assume that every Openfire version or customised installation contains all of them.

Root certificate SHA-256 fingerprint
emSign ECC Root CA - G3 86:A1:EC:BA:08:9C:4A:8D:3B:BE:27:34:C6:12:BA:34:1D:81:3E:04:3C:F9:E8:A8:62:CD:5C:57:A3:6B:BE:6B
emSign Root CA - G1 40:F6:AF:03:46:A9:9A:A1:CD:1D:55:5A:4E:9C:CE:62:C7:F9:63:46:03:EE:40:66:15:83:3D:C8:C8:D0:03:67
emSign ECC Root CA - C3 BC:4D:80:9B:15:18:9D:78:DB:3E:1D:8C:F4:F9:72:6A:79:5D:A1:64:3C:A5:F1:35:8E:1D:DB:0E:DC:0D:7E:B3
emSign Root CA - C1 12:56:09:AA:30:1D:A0:A2:49:B9:7A:82:39:CB:6A:34:21:6F:44:DC:AC:9F:39:54:B1:42:92:F2:E8:C8:60:8F
AAA Certificate Services D7:A7:A0:FB:5D:7E:27:31:D7:71:E9:48:4E:BC:DE:F7:1D:5F:0C:3E:0A:29:48:78:2B:C8:3E:E0:EA:69:9E:F4

emSign ECC Root CA - G3 is the root that signed the compromised intermediates. The other three roots were not implicated in the private-key compromise. However, eMudhra is discontinuing publicly trusted TLS certificate issuance, and browser root programmes are phasing out trust in its remaining TLS hierarchies. Administrators may therefore choose to remove these roots as part of a broader trust-store cleanup, after checking whether any certificates they rely on still chain to them.

According to eMudhra, none of the eight compromised intermediates had issued publicly trusted end-entity certificates before they were revoked. Nevertheless, the recovered private keys could potentially be used to issue fraudulent certificates until the affected CA certificates are no longer trusted.

Using the admin console. Go to Server, then Certificate Stores. Open each trust store listed there and look for entries whose name starts with emSign, and for AAA Certificate Services. By default, server-to-server connections, components and connection managers share one trust store, and client connections use another (which is empty by default), but you may have changed this.

Using the command line. The default trust store for server-to-server connections is resources/security/truststore in your Openfire installation. Its default password is changeit, unless you changed it. List its entries with:

keytool -list -v -keystore resources/security/truststore -storepass changeit

Check the certificate owners and SHA-256 fingerprints against the list above. Do not rely only on the alias: aliases can differ between installations, and a certificate can have a different alias from its subject name.

Repeat this for any other trust store listed on the Certificate Stores page, such as resources/security/client.truststore, using the relevant password.

How to remove them

Remove emSign ECC Root CA - G3 as the essential security mitigation. Consider removing the other three roots as part of a broader trust-store cleanup, but assess the compatibility implications before doing so. You can also remove AAA Certificate Services (see above). Make a backup of your trust stores first: the Certificate Stores page has a backup option, or you can simply copy the files.

Using the admin console. On the trust store page for the connection type, find the emSign entries (and optionally AAA Certificate Services) and delete them.

Using the command line. First identify the alias of each certificate you want to remove by comparing its SHA-256 fingerprint with the list above. Then delete the entry using the exact alias shown by keytool:

keytool -delete -alias "ALIAS_FROM_YOUR_TRUSTSTORE" \
  -keystore resources/security/truststore -storepass changeit

Repeat for each affected trust store, using its own password. Remove emSign ECC Root CA - G3 as the essential mitigation. Removal of the other three emSign roots and AAA Certificate Services is optional and should be considered separately, after checking for dependencies. Restart Openfire afterwards, and run the check again to confirm that the offending certificates are gone.

Enable revocation checking. This is a second line of defence against the compromised intermediates, and it also protects you against other revoked certificates. Openfire 5.0.0 and later can do this. In the admin console, go to Server, Server Settings, Server to Server. Under “Certificate chain checking”, enable “Verify that certificates have not been revoked”. Do the same under Client Connections if you accept client certificates.

Be aware that, by default, Openfire then refuses a connection when it cannot find out whether a certificate has been revoked, for example because a CA’s OCSP or CRL server is unreachable. If that causes trouble with servers you federate with, set the system property xmpp.socket.ssl.certificate.revocation.soft-fail to true. Openfire will then still reject certificates that are known to be revoked, but allow those whose status it cannot determine.

If you run a version older than 5.0.0, there is no revocation checking that you can turn on. Upgrading is the way to get this protection.

What’s next

We are looking at how a future Openfire release can protect existing installations against this kind of incident, without overwriting trust stores that administrators have customised. Until then, the steps above are what you need.

If you have questions, or run into problems, let us know on the community forum.

Sources

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